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Abstract
The assumptions needed to prove Cox’s Theorem are discussed and examined. Various
sets of assumptions under which a Cox-style theorem can be proved are provided, although
all are rather strong and, arguably, not natural.
I recently wrote a paper (Halpern, 1999) casting doubt on how compelling a justification
for probability is provided by Cox’s celebrated theorem (Cox, 1946). I have received (what
seems to me, at least) a surprising amount of response to that article. Here I attempt to
clarify the degree to which I think Cox’s theorem can be salvaged and respond to a glaring
inaccuracy on my part pointed out by Snow (1998). (Fortunately, it is an inaccuracy that
has no affect on either the correctness or the interpretation of the results of my paper.) I
have tried to write this note with enough detail so that it can be read independently of
my earlier paper, but I encourage the reader to consult the earlier paper as well as the two
major sources it is based on (Cox, 1946; Paris, 1994), for further details and discussion.
Here is the basic situation. Cox’s goal is to “try to show that . . . it is possible to derive
the rules of probability from two quite primitive notions which are independent of the notion
of ensemble and which . . . appeal rather immediately to common sense” (Cox, 1946). To
that end, he starts with a function Bel that associates a real number with each pair (U, V )
of subsets of a domain W such that U 6= ∅. We write Bel(V |U) rather than Bel(U, V ), since
we think of Bel(V |U) as the belief, credibility, or likelihood of V given U . Cox’s Theorem
as informally understood, states that if Bel satisfies two very reasonable restrictions, then
Bel must be isomorphic to a probability measure. The first one says that the belief in V
complement (denoted V ) given U is a function of the belief in V given U ; the second says
that the belief in V ∩V ′ given U is a function of the belief in V ′ given V ∩U and the belief
in V given U . Formally, we assume that there are functions S : IR → IR and F : IR2 → IR
such that
A1. Bel(V |U) = S(Bel(V |U)) if U 6= ∅, for all U, V ⊆W .
A2. Bel(V ∩ V ′|U) = F (Bel(V ′|V ∩ U),Bel(V |U)) if V ∩ U 6= ∅, for all U, V, V ′ ⊆W .
If Bel is a probability measure, then we can take S(x) = 1− x and F (x, y) = xy.
Before going on, notice that Cox’s result does not claim that Bel is a probability measure,
just that it is isomorphic to a probability measure. Formally, this means that there is a
continuous one-to-one onto function g : IR → IR such that g ◦ Bel is a probability measure
on W , and
g(Bel(V |U))× g(Bel(U)) = g(Bel(V ∩ U)) if U 6= ∅, (1)
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where Bel(U) is an abbreviation for Bel(U |W ).
If we are willing to accept that belief is real valued (this is a strong assumption since,
among other things, it commits us to the assumption that beliefs cannot be incomparable—
for any two events U and V , we must have either Bel(U) ≤ Bel(V ) or Bel(V ) ≤ Bel(U)),
then A1 and A2 are very reasonable. If this were all it took to prove Cox’s Theorem, then
it indeed would be a very compelling argument for the use of probability.
Unfortunately, it is well known that A1 and A2 by themselves do not suffice to prove
Cox’s Theorem. Dubois and Prade (1990) give an example of a function Bel, defined on a
finite domain, that satisfies A1 and A2 with F (x, y) = min(x, y) and S(x) = 1 − x but is
not isomorphic to a probability measure. Thus, if we are to prove Cox’s Theorem, we need
to have additional assumptions.
It is hard to dig out of Cox’s papers (1946, 1978) exactly what additional assumptions
his proofs need. I show in my paper that the result is false under some quite strong
assumptions (see below). My result also suggests that most of the other proofs given of
Cox-style theorems are at best incomplete (that is, they require additional assumptions
beyond those stated by the authors); see my previous paper for discussion. The goal of
this note is to clarify what it takes to prove a Cox-style theorem, by giving a number of
hypotheses under which the result can be proved. All of the positive versions of the theorem
that I state can be proved in a straightforward way by adapting the proof given by Paris
(1994). (This is the one correct, rigorous proof of the result of which I am aware, with
all the hypotheses stated clearly.) Nevertheless, I believe it is worth identifying all these
variants, since they are philosophically quite different.
Paris (1994) proves Cox’s Theorem under the following additional assumptions:
Par1. The range of Bel is [0, 1].
Par2. Bel(∅|U) = 0 and Bel(U |U) = 1 if U 6= ∅.
Par3. The S in A1 is decreasing.
Par4. The F is A2 is strictly increasing (in each coordinate) in (0, 1]2 and continuous.
Par5. For all 0 ≤ α, β, γ ≤ 1 and ǫ > 0, there are sets U1 ⊇ U2 ⊇ U3 ⊇ U4 such that U3 6= ∅,
and each of |Bel(U4|U3)− α|, |Bel(U3|U2)− β|, and |Bel(U2|U1)− γ| is less than ǫ.
Theorem 1: (Paris, 1994) If Par1-5 hold, then Bel is isomorphic to a probability measure.
There is nothing special about 0 and 1 in Par1 and Par2; all we need to assume is that
there is some interval [e,E] with e < E such that Bel(V |U) ∈ [e,E] for all V,U ⊆ W ,
Bel(∅|U) = e, and Bel(U |U) = E. These assumptions certainly seem reasonable, provided
we accept that beliefs should be linearly ordered. Nor is it hard too hard to justify Par3
and Par4 (indeed, Cox justifies them in his original paper). The problematic assumption
here is Par5 (called A4 in my earlier paper and Co5 by Paris (1994)). Par5 can be thought
of as a density requirement; among other things, it says that for each fixed V , the set of
values that Bel(U |V ) takes on is dense in [0, 1]. It follows that, in particular, to satisfy
Par5, W must be infinite; Par5 cannot be satisfied in finite domains. While “natural” and
“reasonable” are, of course, in the eye of the beholder, it does not strike me as a natural
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or reasonable assumption in any obvious sense of the words. This is particularly true since
many domains of interest in AI (and other application areas) are finite; any version of Cox’s
Theorem that uses Par5 is simply not applicable in these domains. Can we weaken Par5?
Cox does not require anything like Par5 in his paper. He does require at various times
that F be twice differentiable, with a continuous second derivative, and that S be twice
differentiable.1 While differentiability assumptions are perhaps not as compelling as conti-
nuity assumptions, they do seem like reasonable technical restrictions. Unfortunately, the
counterexample I give in my earlier paper shows that these assumptions do not suffice to
prove Cox’s theorem. What I show is the following.
Theorem 2: (Halpern, 1999) There is a function Bel0, a finite domain W , and functions
S and F satisfying A1 and A2, respectively, such that
• Bel0(V |U) ∈ [0, 1] for U 6= ∅,
• S(x) = 1− x (so that S is strictly decreasing and infinitely differentiable),
• F is infinitely differentiable, nondecreasing in each argument in [0, 1]2, and strictly in-
creasing in each argument in (0, 1]2. Moreover, F is commutative, F (x, 0) = F (0, x) =
0, and F (x, 1) = F (1, x) = x.
However, Bel0 is not isomorphic to a probability measure.
To understand what the makes counterexample tick and the role of Par5, it is useful to
review part of Cox’s argument. In the course of his proof, Cox shows that A2 forces F to
be an associative function, that is, that
F (x, F (y, z)) = F (F (x, y), z). (2)
Here is Cox’s argument.
Suppose U1 ⊇ U2 ⊇ U3 ⊇ U4. Let x = Bel(U4|U3), y = Bel(U3|U2), z = Bel(U2|U1),
u1 = Bel(U4|U2), u2 = Bel(U3|U1), and u3 = Bel(U4|U1). By A2, we have that u1 = F (x, y),
u2 = F (y, z), and u3 = F (x, u2) = F (u1, z). It follows that F (x, F (y, z)) = F (F (x, y), z).
Note that this argument does not show that F (x, F (y, z)) = F (F (x, y), z) for all x, y, z.
It shows only that the equality holds for those x, y, z for which there exist U1 ⊆ U2 ⊆ U3 ⊆
U4 such that x = Bel(U1|U2), y = Bel(U2|U3), and z = Bel(U3|U4). Par5 guarantees that
the set of such x, y, z is dense in [0, 1]3. Combined with the continuity of F assumed in
Par4, this tells us that (2) holds for all x, y, z.
I had claimed in my earlier paper that none of the authors who had proved variants
of Cox’s Theorem, including Cox himself, Acze´l, and Reichenbach, seemed to be aware of
the need to make (2) hold for all x, y, z.2 I was wrong in including Cox in this list. (This
is the glaring inaccuracy I referred to above.) As Snow (1998) points out, Cox actually
does realize that F must satisfy (2) for all x, y, z, and explicitly makes this assumption at
1. Cox never collects his assumptions in any one place, so it is somewhat difficult to tell exactly what he
thinks he needs for his proof. More on this later.
2. As I pointed out in in my earlier paper, Acze´l recognized this problem in later work (Acze´l & Daroczy,
1975).
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a certain point in his first paper (Cox, 1946), although he does not make this assumption
explicitly in his (more informal) later paper (Cox, 1978).
Unfortunately, although Cox escapes from my criticism by recognizing the need to make
this assumption, it does not make his theorem any less palatable. Indeed, if anything, it
makes matters worse. Associativity is a rather strong assumption, as Cox himself shows.
In fact, Cox shows that if F is associative and has continuous second derivatives, then
F is isomorphic to multiplication, that is, there exists a function f and constant C such
that Cf [F (x, y)] = f(x)f(y). Let me stress that the conclusion that F is isomorphic to
multiplication just follows from the fact that it is associative and has continuous second
derivatives, and has nothing to do with A2. Of course, by the time we are willing to assume
that there is a function F that is isomorphic to multiplication that satisfies A2, then we
are well on the way to showing that Bel is isomorphic to a probability measure. For future
reference, I remark that Paris shows (in his Lemma 3.7) that Par1, Par2, Par4, and Par5
suffice to show that F is isomorphic to multiplication (and that we can take C = 1).
In any case, suppose we are willing to strengthen Par4 so as to require F to be associative
as well as continuous and strictly increasing. Does this suffice to get rid of Par5 altogether?
Unfortunately, it does not seem to.
Later in his argument, Cox shows that S must satisfy the following two functional
equations for all sets U1 ⊇ U2 ⊇ U3:
S[S(Bel(U2|U1))] = Bel(U2|U1) (3)
and
Bel(U2|U1)S(Bel(U3|U1)/Bel(U2|U1)) = S[S(Bel(U2|U1))/S(Bel(U3|U1))]S(Bel(U3|U1))
(4)
This means that for all x and y > 0 for which there exist sets U1, U2, and U3 such that
x = Bel(U3|U1) and y = Bel(U2|U1), we have
S(S(y)) = y (5)
and
yS(x/y) = S(x)S[S(y)/S(x)]. (6)
Cox actually wants these equations to hold for all x and y. Paris shows that this follows from
Par1–5. (Here is Paris’s argument. Using Par3, it can be shown that S is continuous (see
(Paris, 1994, Lemma 3.8)). This combined with Par5 easily gives us that (5) holds for all
y ∈ [0, 1]. (6) follows from Par5 and the fact that F must be isomorphic to multiplication;
as I mentioned above, the latter fact is shown by Paris to follow from Par1, Par2, Par4, and
Par5.) Without Par5, we need to assume that (5) and (6) both hold for all x and y, and
that is what Cox does.3
In the proof given by Paris for Theorem 1, the only use made of Par5 is in deriving the
associativity of F and the fact that S satisfies (5) and (6). Thus, we immediately get the
following variant of Cox’s Theorem.
3. Actually, Cox starts with (4) and derives the more symmetric functional equation yS[S(x)/y] =
xS[S(y)/x], rather than (6). It is this latter functional equation that he assumes holds for all x and y.
If we replace x by S(x) everywhere and use (5), then we get (6).
432
Cox’s Theorem Revisited
Theorem 3: If Par1-4 hold and, in addition, the F in A2 is associative and the S in A1
satisfies both (5) and (6) for all x, y ∈ [0, 1], then Bel is isomorphic to a probability measure.
I stress here that A1 and A2 place constraints only on how F and S act on the range of
Bel (that is, on elements x of the form Bel(U) for some subset U of W ), while associativity,
(5), and (6) place constraints on the global behavior of F and S, that is, on how F and S
act even on arguments not in the range of Bel. The example I give in my earlier paper can
be viewed as giving a Bel for which it is possible to find F and S satisfying A1 and A2, but
there is no F satisfying A2 which is associative on [0, 1].
We can get a variant even closer to what Cox (1946) shows by replacing Par4 by the
assumption that F is twice differentiable. Note that we need to make some continuity,
monotonicity, or differentiability assumptions on F . As I mentioned earlier, Dubois and
Prade show there is a Bel that is not isomorphic to a probability function for which S(x) =
1−x and F (x, y) = min(x, y). The min function is differentiable (and a fortiori continuous),
but is not twice differentiable, nor is it strictly increasing in each coordinate in (0, 1]2
(although it is nondecreasing).
The advantage of replacing Par5 by the requirement that F be associative and that S
satisfy (5) and (6) is that this variant of Cox’s Theorem now applies even if W is finite. On
the other hand, it is hard (at least for me) to view (6) as a “natural” requirement. While
assumptions like associativity for F and idempotency for S (i.e., (5)) are certainly natural
mathematical assumptions, the only justification for requiring them on all of [0, 1] seems to
be that they provably follow from the other assumptions for certain tuples in the range of
Bel. Is this reasonable or compelling? Of course, that is up to the reader to judge. In any
case, these are assumptions that needed to be highlighted by anyone using Cox’s Theorem
as a justification for probability, rather than being swept under the carpet. The requirement
that S must satisfy (6) is not even mentioned by Snow (1998), let alone discussed. Snow is
not alone; it does not seem to be mentioned in any other discussion of Cox’s results either
(other than by Paris). Of course, we can avoid mentioning (5) and (6) by just requiring
that S(x) = 1− x (as Cox (1978) does). However, this makes the result less compelling.
A number of other variants of Cox’s Theorem which are correct are discussed in (Halpern,
1999, Section 5). Let me conclude by formalizing two of them that apply to finite domains,
but use Par5 (or slight variants of it), rather than assuming that F must be associative and
that S must satisfy (5) and (6) for all pairs x, y ∈ [0, 1].
The first essentially assumes that we can extend any finite domain to an infinite domain
by adding a sufficiently many “irrelevant” propositions, such as the tosses of fair coin. As
I observed in my earlier paper, this type of extendability argument is fairly standard. For
example, it is made by Savage (1954) in the course of justifying one of his axioms for
preference. Snow (1998) essentially uses it as well. Formally, this gives us the following
variant of Cox’s Theorem, whose proof is a trivial variant of that of Theorem 1.
Theorem 4: Given a function Bel on a domain W , suppose there exists a domain W+ ⊇W
and a function Bel+ extending Bel defined on all subsets of W+ such that A1 and A2 hold
for Bel+ and all subsets U, V, V ′ of W+ and Par1-5 hold for Bel+. Then Bel+ (and hence
Bel) is isomorphic to a probability measure.
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The problem with this approach is that it requires us to extend Bel to events we were never
interested in considering in the first place, and to do so in a way that is guaranteed to
continue to satisfy Par1-5.
The second variant assumes that Bel is defined not just on one domain W , but on all
domains (or at least, a large family of domains); the functions F and S then have to be
uniform across all domains. More precisely, we would get the following.
Theorem 5: Suppose we have a function Bel defined on all domains W in some set W of
domains, there exist functions F and S such that F and S satisfy A1 and A2 for all the
domains W ∈ W, Par1–4 hold for F and S, and the following variant of Par5 holds:
Par5′. for all 0 ≤ α, β, γ ≤ 1 and ǫ > 0, there exists W ∈ W and sets U1, U2, U3, U4 ⊆ W
such that U1 ⊇ U2 ⊇ U3 ⊇ U4, U3 6= ∅, and each of |Bel(U4|U3)−α|, |Bel(U3|U2)−β|,
and |Bel(U2|U1)− γ| is less than ǫ.
Then Bel is uniformly isomorphic to a probability measure, in that there exists a function
g : IR→ IR such that for all W ∈ W, we have that g ◦ Bel is a probability measure on each
W and for all U, V ⊆W , we have
g(Bel(V |U))× g(Bel(U)) = g(Bel(V ∩ U)) if U 6= ∅.
The advantage of this formulation is thatW can consist of only finite domains; we never
have to venture into the infinite (although then W would have to include infinitely many
finite domains). This conception of one function Bel defined uniformly over a family of
domains seems consistent with the philosophy of both Cox and Jaynes (see, in particular,
(Jaynes, 1996)).
While the hypotheses of Theorems 4 and 5 may seem more reasonable than some others
(at least, to some readers!), note that they still both essentially require Par5 and, like all
the other variants of Cox’s Theorem that I am aware of, disallow a notion of belief that has
only finitely many gradations. One can justify a notion of belief that takes on all values
in [0, 1] by continuity considerations (again, assuming that one accepts a linearly-ordered
notion of belief), but it is still a nontrivial requirement.4
I will stop at this point and leave it to the reader to form his or her own beliefs.
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